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i 
ARGUMENT 
I 
CONTRARY TO EMPLOYMENT SECURITY'S ARGUMENT AT POINT II 
OF THEIR BRIEF THE CONCLUSION OF SHARED FAULT IS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY ANY EVIDENCE 
Respondent Department of Employment Security (Employment 
Security) argues that the legal conclusion of shared fault is 
supported by the Board of Review's suggestion that had Petitioner 
Department of the Air Force (Air Force) recalled Dr. Kuntz to 
rebut Respondent Gregory DeBloois's (DeBloois) testimony that he 
had "drunk a horrendous amount of water" the ALJ would have ruled 
in favor of the Air Force. This suggestion flies in the face of 
the entire record and in particular the findings and conclusions 
of the ALJ, which the Board of Review adopted to reach its 
decision. 
In the ALJ's decision following the first hearing the 
findings of fact deal predominantly with the mechanics of 
DeBloois providing his specimen and his denial that he provided 
water, Record at'71-72. Employment Security's after the fact 
discovery that the ALJ would have been sufficiently impressed 
with further testimony by Dr. Kuntz does not appear in the 
record. Despite extensive testimony by Dr. Kuntz on the chemical 
and physical evidence showing the sample was not urine the ALJ 
concluded "The Administrative Law Judge was unable to conclude, 
through competent evidence, that the claimant did not submit a 
legitimate urine specimen ..." record at 75. His focus was on ". 
. . no other medical evidence presented at the hearing to confirm 
that the liquid in the sample bottle provided by the claimant was 
not his own urine." record at 75. There was no indication he 
believed DeBloois's testimony on "horrendous amounts of water" to 
carry the day, only that "there was no evidence" supporting Air 
Force's position. The ALJ simply ignored Air Force's testimony. 
The ALJ's statement is: 
"Well, I guess in this particular hearing, what I had 
not had provided in the way of evidence is any type of 
other information from the testing laboratory as to 
what other testing procedures were -- was used. I have 
no -- I have no test form from the employer. I do not 
know that -- excuse me, from Northwest Toxicology, I do 
not know for a certainty, I do not have documentation 
that the, uh, Northwest Toxicology tested for, uh, drug 
-- drugs or whether or not they, uh, tested for any 
other substance in that urine. We -- we do not have 
that report, and I'm assuming, Mr., uh, Price, you 
don't have that as part of your documentation, record 
at 67. 
This does not show any inclination to buy into the 
especially dilute theory, only a failure to present any evidence 
he deemed to be admissible. Notably, Employment Security 
instructed the ALJ on the admissibility of that evidence when it 
remanded this case to him. It did not instruct him to reconsider 
the dilute specimen testimony. 
The ALJ ruled against the Air Force not because of the 
"horrendous amounts of water" testimony but because he declined 
to accept the expert testimony of Dr. Kuntz. "The Administrative 
Law Judge was unable to conclude, through competent evidence, 
that the claimant did not submit a legitimate urine specimen on 
February 8, 1993." record at 75. 
The conclusion of shared fault is not only not supported by 
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substantial evidence within the record, it is not supported by 
any evidence within the record, and must be reversed. 
II 
THE FINDING OF SHARED FAULT IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
Employment Security suggests that it has appropriately 
exercised discretion in finding shared fault. As shown above, 
there is no evidence supporting the proposition that the ALJ 
would have decided differently in the first hearing had Air Force 
recalled Dr. Kuntz. 
Air Force acknowledges that Utah Code Ann. 35-4-406 and Utah 
Code Ann. 35-4-6 grant Employment Security discretion. That 
discretion is abused if the decision of Employment Security ". . 
exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." Morton 
Intern., Inc. vs. Auditing Div. , 814 P.2d 581, 587-88 (Utah 
1991). 
Where there is no evidence in the record supporting the 
underlying fact a finding of fact, like the finding that the ALJ 
would have decided differently had Dr. Kuntz been recalled as a 
witness, is an abuse of discretion. The shared fault conclusion 
is based on abused discretion and must be reversed. 
Ill 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY IS REQUIRED TO COLLECT THE ARREARAGE 
NO LATER THAN TWO YEARS AFTER A FINDING OF FAULT 
Employment Security cites Rule 562-311-105, Utah Admin. 
Code. (1994), for the proposition that it may indefinitely defer 
collection of the sums DeBloois defrauded from the government. 
That rule cites 20 CFR § 609.11, attached. 20 CFR § 609.11(a)(2) 
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provides that where a State agency, like Employment Security, has 
found, after a hearing, that an individual has made a false 
statement or representation sums paid that individual will be 
recovered within two years of the finding. 
In this matter Employment Security found the specimen was 
not urine, record at 181, and accordingly that DeBloois obtained 
benefits through false statements that he had submitted urine as 
his specimen. That finding was made March 25, 1994. Employment 
Security is required by 20 CFR § 609.11, and by 562-311-105, Utah 
Admin. Code. (1994), which incorporates 20 CFR § 609.11 by 
reference, to collect the overpayment from DeBloois no later than 
March 25, 1996. 
CONCLUSION 
Contrary to the assertions of Employment Security there is 
no evidence, let alone substantial evidence, in this extensive 
record to support the proposition that had Air Force recalled Dr. 
Kuntz to the witness stand the ALJ would have ruled for Air 
Force. The ALJ's comments, both during the hearings and in his 
decisions, show he was either confused or uninformed as to what 
expert testimony is and what its role is in an evidentiary 
hearing. The ALJ erred. The Board of Review remanded this 
matter to him with very specific instructions telling how he 
erred and how to correct that err at the next hearing. He did. 
Not because the evidence on dilution was better, or different, 
but because he had been schooled in the applicable rules of 
evidence and then chose to give credence to Dr. Kuntz's testimony 
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as he should have done in the first instance. 
Air Force did nothing to lead to the conclusion it shared 
fault. The Board of Review's conclusion that it did is not 
supported by the evidence and is an abuse of discretion. By the 
applicable rules Employment Security is required to recoup the 
overpayment from DeBloois, either immediately because it was 
fraudulently obtained, or at the very least within two years of 
the date it found information provided by DeBloois was false. 
This court should reverse the Board of Review and order 
Employment Security to recoup from DeBloois unemployment 
compensation payments made to him and paid for with Air Force 
funds. 
Dated this \ ^ day of May, 1995. 
Robert| 
Attorney for Pte#itioner 
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ADDENDUM 
20 CFR § 6 0 9 . 1 1 
§609.11 20CFRCh V (4-1-94 Edition) 
§609.11 Overpayments; penalties for 
fraud. 
(a) False statements and representa-
tions Section 8507ia) of the Act pro-
vides t ha t if a State agency, the De-
par tment or a court of competent ju-
risdiction finds than an individual— 
(1) Knowingly nas made, or caused to 
De made by anotner, a false s ta tement 
or representation of a mater ia l fact, or 
knowingly has iailed, or caused an-
other to fail, to disclose a mater ial 
fact, and 
(2) i^s a result of t ha t act ion has re-
ceived an amount as UCFE to which 
the individual was not ent i t led, the in-
dividual shall repay the amount to the 
S ta te agency or the Depar tment In-
stead of requiring repayments , the 
S ta te agency or the Depar tment may 
recover the amoant by deductions from 
UCFE payable to the individual during 
the 2-year period after the date of the 
finding A finding by a S ta t e agency or 
the Department may be made only 
after an opportunity for a fair hearing, 
subject to such further review as may 
be appropriate under §609 7 
(b) Prosecution for fraud. Section 1919 
of t i t l e 18, United Sta tes Code, provides 
t h a t whoever makes a false s ta tement 
or representation of a mater ia l fact 
knowing i t to be false, or knowingly 
fails to disclose a mater ia l fact, to ob-
ta in or increase for himself or for any 
other individual any payment author-
ized to be paid under chapter 85 of t i t le 
5, United States Code, or under an 
agreement thereunder, shall be fined 
not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not 
more than one year, or both. 
(c) Absence of fraud If a S t a t e agency 
or court of competent jurisdiction finds 
t ha t an individual has received a pay-
ment of UCFE to which the individual 
was not entitled unaer the Act and this 
part , which was not due to a false 
s t a tement or representat ion as pro-
vided m paragraph (a) or (b) of this sec-
tion, the individual shall be liable to 
repay to the applicable S ta t e the total 
sum of the payment to which the indi-
vidual was not entitled, and the Sta te 
agency shall take all reasonable meas-
ures authorized under any S ta te law or 
Federal law to recover for the account 
of the United States the to ta l sum of 
the payment to which the individual 
was not entitled. 
(d) Recovery by ojfset (1) The State 
agencv shall recover, insofar as is pos-
sible the amount of any overpayment 
wmch is not repaid by the individual, 
bv deductions from any UCFE payaole 
to the individual under the Act and 
this part, or from any unemDloyment 
compensation payable to the individual 
under any Federal unemployment com-
pensation law administered oy the 
State agency, or from any assistance 
or anoyance payable to the individual 
with respect to unemployment under 
any other Federal law administered by 
the State agency 
(2) A State agency shall also recover, 
insofar as is possible, the amount of 
any overpayment of UCFE made to the 
individual by another S ta te , by deduc-
tions from any UCFE payable by the 
State agency to the individual under 
the Act and this part , or from any un-
employment compensation payable to 
the individual under any Federal un-
employment compensation law admin-
istered by the S ta te agency, or from 
any assistance or allowance payable to 
the individual with respect to unem-
ployment under any other Federal law 
administered by the S ta te agency 
(3) Recoupment of fraudulent over-
payments referred to in paragraph (a) 
of this section shall be l imited to the 2-
year period stated in t h a t paragraph 
Recoupment of fraudulent overpay-
ments referred to m paragraph (b) of 
this section, and nonfraudulent over-
payments referred to in paragraph (c) 
of this section shall be subject to any 
time l imitation on recoupment pro-
vided for m the Sta te law t h a t applies 
to the case 
(e) Debts due the United States UCFE 
payable to an individual shall be ao-
plied by the State agency for the recov-
ery by offset of any debt due to the 
Umted States from the individual, but 
snail not be applied or used by the 
State agency in any manner for the 
payment of any debt of the individual 
to any Sta te or any other en t i ty or per-
son except pursuant to a court order 
for child suoport or al imony in accord-
ance with the law of the S ta t e and sec-
tion 459 of tne Social Securi ty Act, 42 
U S C. 659. 
(f) Application of State law (1) Except 
as indicated in paragraph (a) of this 
section, any provision of S ta te law 
44 
Employment and Training Administration, Labor §609.14 
tha t may be applied for the recovery of 
overpayments or prosecution for fraud, 
and any provision of State law author-
izing* waiver of recovery of overpay-
ments of unemployment compensation, 
shall be applicable to UCFE. 
(2) In the case of any finding of false 
s ta tement or representation under the 
Act and paragraph (a) of this section, 
or prosecution for fraud under 18 U.S.C. 
1919 or pursuant to paragraph (f)(1) of 
this section, the individual shall be dis-
qualified or penalized in accordance 
with the provisions of the applicable 
S ta te law relating to fraud in connec-
tion with a claim for State unemploy-
ment compensation. 
(g) Final decision. Recovery of any 
overpayment of UCFE shall not be en-
forced by the S ta te agency until the 
determination or redetermination es-
tablishing the overpayment has be-
come final, or if appeal is taken from 
the determination or redetermination, 
unti l the decision after opportunity for 
a fair hearing has become final. 
(h) Procedural requirements. (1) The 
provisions of paragraphs (c), (d), and (g) 
of §609.6 shall apply to determinations 
and redeterminations made pursuant 
to this section. 
(2) The provisions of §609.7 shall 
apply to determinations and 
redeterminations made pursuant to 
this section. 
(i) Fraud detection and prevention. 
Provisions in the procedures of each 
S ta te with respect to detection and 
prevention of fraudulent overpayments 
of UCFE shall be, as a minimum, com-
mensurate with the procedures adopted 
by the State with respect to Sta te un-
employment compensation and consist-
ent with the Secretary's "Standard for 
Fraud and Overpayment Detection" 
(Employment Security Manual, part V, 
section 7510 et sea.). * 
(j) Recovered overpayments. An 
amount repaid or recouped under this 
section shall be— 
(1) Deposited in the fund from which 
payment was made, if the repayment 
was to a State agency; or 
(2) Returned to the Treasury of the 
United States and credited to the cur-
rent applicable appropriation, fund, or 
account from which payment was 
made, if the repayment was to the De-
par tment . 
§ 609.12 Inviolate rights to UCFE. 
Except as specifically provided in 
this par t , the r ights of individuals to 
UCFE shall be protected in the same 
manner and to the same extent as the 
r ights of persons to State unemploy-
ment compensation are protected 
under the applicable State law. Such 
measures shall include protection of 
applicants for UCFE from waiver, re-
lease, assignrrient, pledge, encum-
brance, levy, execution, a t tachment , 
and garnishment of their rights to 
UCFE, except as provided in §609.11. In 
the same manner and to the same ex-
tent , individuals shall be protected 
from discrimination and obstruction in 
regard to seeking, applying for, and re-
ceiving any r ight to UCFE. 
§609.13 Recordkeeping; disclosure of 
information. 
(a) Recordkeeping. Each Sta te agency 
will m a k e and maintain records per-
ta ining to the administrat ion of the 
UCFE Program as the Department re-
quires, and will make all such records 
available for inspection, examination, 
and aud i t by such Federal officials or 
employees as the Department may des-
ignate or as may be required by law. 
(b) Disclosure of Information. Informa-
tion in records maintained by a Sta te 
agency in administering the UCFE Pro-
gram shall be kept confidential, and in-
formation in such records may be dis-
closed only in the same manner and to 
the same extent as information with 
respect to S ta te unemployment com-
pensat ion and the ent i t lement of indi-
viduals thereto may be disclosed under 
the applicable S ta te law. This provi-
sion on the confidentiality of informa-
tion mainta ined in the administrat ion 
of the UCFE Program shall not apply, 
however, to the Department or for the 
purposes of §§609.11 or 609.13, or in the 
case of information, reports and stud-
ies required pursuant_ to §§609.17 or 
609.25, or where the result would be in-
consis tent with the Freedom of Infor-
mat ion Act (5 U.S.C. 552), the Privacy 
Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a), or regula-
tions of the Department promulgated 
thereunder . 
§609.14 Payments to States. 
(a.) State entitlement. Each Sta te is en-
t i t led to be paid by the United Sta tes 
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